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Abstract
In this thesis I present a strong and universally compelling case for the importance
of Heidegger’s question, namely, the question of the meaning of being. I show how the
being-question has been obscured and forgotten over the past two millennia of western
philosophy. I attempt to raise this question again, and elucidate why it is an important one
to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human endeavor. My aim
is to reach those of you who would normally not come across, or might even dismiss,
Heidegger’s work. I hope the arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may
be, that reawakening ourselves to the question of being is a task that we must undertake.
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Introduction
In his 1927 work Being and Time, Martin Heidegger seeks to “raise anew the
question of the meaning of being,”1 which he believed to have been deeply misconstrued
by the preceding two millennia of western philosophy. Alluding to the the tradition
started by the Greeks, he begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato’s Sophist: “For
manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression
‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become
perplexed.”2 Heidegger uses this passage to convey an important point: The problem of
being, at first, doesn’t even seem like a problem to us. But when we actually try to
articulate what we mean by being, that is when we get into trouble. The issue for us,
which Heidegger seeks to clarify, is to overcome our natural disposition to think that we
already understand everything. This disposition, driven by our desire to master reality,
masks a deeper anxiety over our challenge of existing as finite beings in a world that
resists our life goals.3 Heidegger wants us to come to terms with our anxiety and let go of
our desire to master reality, and he begins this endeavor with the being-question.
In this paper, I attempt to explain the controversial notion of what exactly
Heidegger meant to ask. I defend his asking of this question, and elucidate why it is an
important one to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human
endeavor, especially in modern times. While my primary focus is Being and Time and the
arguments therein, I draw significant inspiration from several secondary texts as well, the
first of which is John Haugeland’s Dasein Disclosed. Haugeland offers an especially
1
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distinctive and compelling interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy. A recurring theme
for Heidegger, throughout his works, is an attempt to get at what is most fundamental. I
think Haugeland’s reading of Heidegger embodies this aim, perhaps going further than
Heidegger himself. Mathew Halteman’s Ontotheology is another secondary text that
provides support to my writing. Halteman’s explanation of Heidegger’s project is
uniquely straightforward, and as such, it influences several of my arguments.
Thus, in drawing inspiration from Haugeland, Halteman, and several other
Heidegger scholars, I intend this paper to make a strong, universally compelling case for
the importance of Heidegger’s question. My aim is to reach those of you who would
normally not come across, or might even dismiss, Heidegger’s work. I hope the
arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may be, that reawakening ourselves
to the question of the meaning of being is a task that we must undertake.
A quick note on Heidegger’s much criticized cameo into politics: “Heidegger was
born; he was a Nazi; he died,”4 as Haugeland concisely puts it. Heidegger spent close to a
decade involved with the Nazi party. Undoubtedly, this fact is highly disturbing. One
might question how such a well renowned intellectual could commit such a grave
mistake, and rightly so. This might even discourage some from engaging with
Heidegger’s philosophy at all. However, I maintain that the issues taken up in this paper
have no bearing on Heidegger’s politics. And as such, this is the first and last time I
mention it. Alright, let’s discuss being.

4
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Why Discuss Being?
Why is being even worth discussing? What it means to be, to many, is starkly
obvious. To be just means to exist, right?5 If something has being, it appears that all we
mean is that it exists, it is something, rather than nothing. What is the point of asking
about the “meaning of being,” if being is so obvious to us already? For Heidegger, this is
exactly why we should be asking this question.
Let’s start by considering a few examples of the many different ways in which
we use “be”.6 For instance, trees can be - a seed germinates, a tree grows, it wilts, and it
dies – ceasing to be anymore. Thanksgiving dinner is, while I uncomfortably sit across
the table from my extended family, sharing small talk and eating too much food. It ceases
to be when everyone attending “…give[s] it up…”7. A diamond comes to be when carbon
atoms assimilate under specific conditions, and it persists as a diamond until this atomic
structure breaks down. A number also is, even with no mass or location in space-time.
Some might argue that it always was and always will be. We use these various senses of
the word “be” with an implicit understanding of their difference. Yet, each time we use it,
we are covertly implying that something exists. The tree, thanksgiving, a number, all
must first exist somewhere, in the world, in my mind, before I can refer to them with
words. While there are many different ways in which we use “be,” there also appears to
be a certain consistency in this variety. This peculiarity is enough, at least for now, to
warrant further investigation into the meaning of being.

5
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When Heidegger discusses being, it is important to note that he is not only
discussing about the word “being”, but also about our understanding of being. Being
reveals itself, although only obscurely, not only when one uses words like “is” and “am,”
but also, “in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities…”8. Entities
themselves are anything and everything that has existed, currently exits, can and will ever
exist. Cars, humans, paintings, physics, iPhones, langue, laughs, smiles, thanksgiving,
and even God are all entities. When I talk about entities, I already posses an
understanding of being. Even when I am not speaking, and just driving my car for
instance, I already posses an understanding of being. The car, the road it is on, the place I
am headed to, are all available to me as entities. And because they are, I already posses
an implicit understanding of being – although I may not be aware of this.
The important point for us to grasp for now, is that the meaning of being is
worthy of further investigation. In fact, Heidegger claims that the being-question, “must
be formulated… it must be made transparent, and in an appropriate way…”9. The fact
that we all possess an implicit understanding of being, the fact that being obscures
itself,10 the fact that we use being in so many different contexts, the fact that we think
being is plainly obvious – that is all enough to justify further investigation into this
question. As such, as philosophers, we must make an attempt at clarifying our “…vague
average understanding of being…”11.

8
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The Structure of Inquiry & The Ontological Difference
The being-question, just like any other, is a form of inquiry. Heidegger writes,
“Every inquiry is a seeking… [It is] guided beforehand by what is sought.”12 Inquiry is a
guided seeking, that, by virtue of being a guided seeking, possesses three characteristics.
First, there is a “that which is interrogated,”13 which constitutes the domain in which the
seeker is inquiring into. A distraught mother inquiring into the whereabouts of her son
during school hours, would not, if she were seeking the truth of the matter, be asking the
barista at a Starbucks in the next town over. Unless, of course, she had reason to do so,
which would thus alter the domain of inquiry. Before the mother can inquire, she must be
familiar with this domain: her son, the phone, the school, the barista, and so on. Second,
there is a “that which is asked about.”14 In this case, that would be the mother’s son, not
her daughter, for example. Third, there is a “that which is to be found out by the
asking,”15 which constitutes what is intended by the inquiry. In our example, this would
be the location of the mother’s son. When this end is reached, our inquiry reaches its
goal. By first understanding the structure inquiry takes in general, we can then apply this
to the being-question.
Just like the inquiry of the mother, the being-question is a form of inquiry.
Conceivably then, it follows the same structure. In this case, what are we asking about?
Well, being of course. Before we can do so, we must be familiar with being. As we noted
earlier, we possess an “average understanding of being,” so we have that covered.

12
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Although it is not a clear understanding, it is enough for us to perform our inquiry. What
do we intend to find out? That would be the meaning of being. So far so good. But we
must still interrogate something. What are we going to interrogate? Before we can
answer this question, we must understand a crucial distinction that Heidegger makes. The
being-question, although it follows the same structure as the mother’s question, is
fundamentally unique.
While the mother’s ontical question is one about entities, the being-question is not
about any such entity. The being-question is ontological in that it is concerned with
being, not entities. Heidegger writes, “Being – that which determines entities as
entities… ‘is’ not itself an entity.”16 Being, in some sense, is more fundamental than
entities, and is not itself an entity. Being grounds entities, it is what “determines” entities
as entities, and enables us to understand them as such. This difference, between being and
entities, is what Heidegger coined the ontological difference: ontological inquiry is
concerned with being, while ontical enquiry is concerned with entities.
But if entities comprise all that exists, and being is not an entity, is being nothing?
Strictly speaking, yes. There is no such thing as being, according to Heidegger. But this
does not mean that there is no issue at stake. When we ask the being-question, rather than
ask about any particular entity, God for instance, we are asking about why that entity is
the entity that it is in the first place. Heidegger writes, “Being lies in the fact that

16
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something is, and in its Being as it is…”17. When we ask the being-question, we are
moving past the mere ontical, into the ontological.
Notice the capitalization of “Being” in the quote above. In his text, Heidegger
differentiates between ontological inquiry qua Being and ontical inquiry qua beings or
entities. To make things easier, for our purposes, I associate ontological inquiry with
being and ontical inquiry with entities. Except when I directly quote Heidegger, this will
be our convention going forward.

17
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Interrogating Dasein
Now that we have an understanding of the ontological difference, we can return
the structure of inquiry that frames the being-question. We are already familiar with
being, so we are able to ask about it, in order to find out its meaning. But what are we
going to interrogate in order to get this answer? We know we must interrogate an entity,
as they comprise everything that exists. But which entity? Given the ontological
difference, how can any entity possibly help us understand being? Heidegger answers:
If to Interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only
the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already
comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we
ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other
than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs
to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding of Being.18
Dasein, literally translated as “being-there,” is the term Heidegger uses to refer to us,
both individually and collectively. “…we are it, each of us, we ourselves…,”19 Heidegger
writes. What determines Dasein as Dasein is that it is capable of asking the beingquestion, and as such, Heidegger argues that we must interrogate Dasein, in order to
clarify this question.
We are still very much interrogating an entity. One might doubt how interrogating
any entity at all can give us a clue into being. But Dasein is not just any entity. Heidegger

18
19

B&T 35
B&T 36

8

explains, “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.”20 Dasein is a special
entity, who’s being is constituted by the fact that its own being matters to it. No other
entity posses such a characteristic – a rock does not ask itself which way to be. By
clarifying the being-question via Dasein, we are “radicalizing” or making explicit our
“pre-ontological” and “vague average” understanding of being.
One might object to Heidegger’s choice to interrogate Dasein for various reasons.
For instance, critics might ask: How does understanding Dasein’s specific being help us
understand being in general? Is Heidegger providing a philosophical account or an
anthropologic investigation? Is Heidegger falsely reducing being to the being of humans?
These are all valid concerns. I will consider and respond to these worries more
extensively in Chapter 11 of this paper. For now, all we need to know is that Heidegger is
interested in us, in Dasein, only insofar as we are capable of asking the being-question.
Because of Dasein’s special ability to do this, compared to that of a rock for example,
interrogating Dasein will be our way forward in our investigation of being.

20
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Dasein as Being-In-The-World
Dasein the entity, has a unique way of being, which Heidegger refers to as
existence.21 This is constituted by the fact that in its very being, Dasein’s being “is an
issue for it.”22 At the outset we sought to reawaken the being-question. We then learnt of
the ontological difference and the priority beings take over entities. We have now arrived
at Dasein, this special entity, as the correct means to move forward with our investigation
into the meaning of being.
So what form does Dasein’s being take? I consider myself as an example to
illuminate this answer. I exist, for Heidegger, as my being is an issue for me. As such, I
must address this issue and figure out who I am. At times I am a student. At other times, I
am a friend, a brother, a son, and so on. In entering into these different roles, I am in a
world, and come across various entities in this world that are part of that role. As a
student, I am in a world where I come across professors, classes, books, laptops, and the
like. Heidegger writes, “…Dasein's Being takes on a definite character… the state of
Being which we have called 'Being-in-the-world'…”23. Dasein’s being, that of being-inthe-world, is necessarily part of Dasein. The “world” here does not refer to just entities:
the outside world, or objects in space-time, or even space time-itself. Rather, the “world”
is, “an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities…”24. It refers to the

21
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being of those entities encountered by Dasein: the meanings those entities have for it.
Crucially, this world also determines how Dasein can act, given that set of meanings.25
Dasein’s being as being-in-the-world conveys that we are necessarily engaged in
certain situations, where entities and others show up, and we are constantly involved with
them. The ways in which we can be involved are determined by the being of those
entities – what determines entities as the entities they are. These situations we are
engaged in change from time to time, and from person to person. For instance, when I am
in math in class, I am engaged in that situation. Calculators, other students, calculus
concepts, the creaking fan, all show up, and I am involved with them. I am in this world
because I am in such a way that these aforementioned things matter to me, and they allow
me possibilities for acting in certain ways with them. While I am in math class, I am also
Indian, an atheist, a friend, and so on – all of these ways of being-in-the-world, of
existing as Dasein, are necessarily possible for me, and it is my responsibility alone to
choose which way to be.

25
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Ready-To-Hand & Present-At-Hand
As Dasein is fundamentally part of the world, and not a separate free-floating
entity, it necessarily possesses a relationship with the world. Understanding this
relationship, and the forms it takes, will enable us to better understand Dasein’s being,
helping us clarify the being-question. Illuminating us on this relationship, Heidegger
writes, “All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being.”26 Dasein’s
being constitutes what Dasein is concerned with, or involved with. Dasein asks how
something or some entity concerns it, or what use it has for that entity. These entities with
which we have concern, Heidegger calls equipment. He says, “The kind of Being which
equipment possesses-in… we call ‘readiness-to-hand’.”27 For example, Heidegger writes,
“In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation,
measurement…”28. All these entities are things that we have a use for. We relate to the
concern we have for them, to their readiness-to-hand. We do not relate to the entity in
itself. We relate to a hammer in terms of its ability to hammer things, for example.
In contrast to our ready-to-hand understanding of entities, we also posses what
Heidegger calls a present-at-hand understanding.29 He explains, “existentia is tantamount
to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of
Dasein’s character.”30 Heidegger’s term present-at-hand, in contrast to ready-to-hand,
refers to the simple observation of the properties or characteristics of an entity. For
instance, this table in front of me is present-at-hand in that it is presented to me, it shows
26
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up for me in the world I am in. I can observe its color, its weight, its size, its smell, and
the like. It is also ready-to-hand for me, insofar as I use it to rest my laptop on, to spread
across it various research materials, and to sit across from my friend, for instance.
Importantly, for Heidegger, scientific investigation is primarily concerned with a
present-at-hand understanding of the entities that it studies. A physicist studying the atom
relates to it as ready-to-hand insofar as she is using the atom to gain knowledge, to write
a dissertation, or to feed her curiosity, for instance. She regards the atom as present-athand when she observes its makeup of protons, neutrons, electrons, quarks, and so on.
She might even calculate its mass and its velocity. And in doing this, she thinks she is
getting a better understanding of what makes the atom what it is – its being. For
Heidegger, this is a misguided notion. In conceiving of ready-to-hand entities as presentat-hand, we are not getting any closer to the being of those entities. In fact, we are
moving farther away from being, fooling ourselves into thinking we are getting closer.
This is not to say that physics, or any science for that matter, is not beneficial for us. We
know much more about our environment because of these endeavors, and should be
grateful for the advances humanity has made because of them.
The point is that science can never tell us about an entity’s being. Heidegger
writes, “Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry
of the positive sciences.”31 Scientific research is ontical, unlike investigation into being,
which is ontological. Scientific investigation always proceeds with certain assumptions
about the being of the entities that it studies. Our physicist takes for granted that

31
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electrons, neutrons, protons and quarks exist, and have a certain way of being. She is able
to improve a limited aspect of her understanding of the world, namely the present-athand, but she misses out on the larger context which allows her to do this in the first
place. But this is not a problem, as long as we reserve our present-at-hand way of
understanding entities to endeavors like scientific investigation.
The trouble for us arises when we attempt to understand Dasein’s being, via
science, as present-at-hand. We are inclined to do this, as in seeing the success of science
with respect to the present-at-hand, we falsely think this success will transfer over to the
study of being. However, unlike present-at-hand entities, Dasein being is not a thing to be
observed or measured. Dasein is an entity, just like the atom, but its being is that of
existence. For instance, I am 190 pounds and 6 feet tall. I am also a homo sapien, a
vertebrate, and a multi-cellular organism. To a sociologist, I am a social agent. These
reductions, however beneficial they may be to us, do not capture who I am, they only
capture me as present-at-hand. With great advances in science we are building up a
stockpile of data about how Dasein is present-at-hand, but none of these advances capture
what it means to be Dasein. In addition, neither is Dasein’s being ready-to-hand. I am not
how useful I am, to me, or anyone else. This is also a limited conception of Dasein’s
being. My being can only be understood as my having to to choose which way to be – the
fact that my being is an issue for me in the world that I am in.32
Understanding Dasein requires understanding how Dasein is being-in-the-world.
As I mentioned before, Dasein is not a free-floating “I”. Rather, Heidegger says, “the
32
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world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world.
Being-in is Being-with Others.”33 Dasein’s everyday being is shared with others.
Dasein’s being is its relation to other entities in its world. This aspect of Dasein’s being,
of our being, is crucial to understanding how we are able to forget the being-question in
the first place.
We’ve seen why we falsely believe we understand being i.e. by thinking a
present-at-hand understanding of an entity captures its being. In the next chapter, we will
explore how this failure of Dasein occurs and why it persists. And in doing so, we will
improve our understanding of Dasein’s being, thus helping us clarify the being-question
itself.

33
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The They & Falling
Heidegger’s aim is to, “raise anew the question of the meaning of being.”34 The
fact that this question must be raised anew is telling. It means that we have forgotten it.
Why so? Since Dasein’s being is its relation to other entities in its world, Heidegger
claims that Dasein can easily lose itself in these entities, and is actually naturally inclined
to do so. I will explain further.
In its “Being-with-one-another”35 Dasein loses itself and starts “Being of the
Others”36. Heidegger expands, “Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with
averageness, which is an existential characteristic of the ‘they’.”37 The “they” is
Heidegger’s term for the collective social conventions, values and set of meanings that
confront Dasein in-the-world it finds itself in. In its attempt to be-with-others Dasein
conforms to the societal values that the “they” presents it, resulting in “averageness.” For
example, when I go to the barber to get my haircut, I choose to make my hair look good –
whatever this may be. I choose this based on what I think looks good, but this conception
of good is not actually my own. It is how they look: what is societally considered a good
look. Even if I want to not look like what is conventionally considered good, and get my
hair dyed purple for instance, this is still in response to the “they.” I am now succumbing
to a different “they,” one might say, the “they” of counter-culture. It appears as if there is
no escape from the influence of the “they.” Insofar as Dasein is-in-a-world, Dasein’s
being is necessarily influenced by the “they.”

34
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They “they,” apart from determining Dasein’s possibilities to be,38 affects Dasein
in another profound way. Heidegger explains, “This care of averageness reveals in turn
an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the ‘leveling down’ of all possibilities of
Being…”39. The “they” causes the “leveling down” of possibilities of being because it
closes off to Dasein the ability to authentically be itself. “This very state of Being, in its
everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up,”40
Heidegger adds. Dasein’s tendency is to conform to the “they.” Even in trying to choose
for itself, authentically, the choices presented to Dasein are those dictated by the “they.”
As such, in its everyday being, Dasein naturally “misses itself” and its authenticity, while
reaching for the “they.”
The results of this “leveling down” are far reaching and dangerous. This is why
reawakening the being-question in us is so hard. And this is why present-at-hand,
scientific understandings of being carry so much force – as they are backed by the “they.”
“Dasein, tranquillized, and ‘understanding’ everything… drifts along towards an
alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Beingin-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating,”41
explains Heidegger. Dasein gets lost in the publicness of the “they,” falls away and
alienates itself from its authentic potentiality for being, thus closing itself off to the
being-question. By “Being-in-the-world” and completely occupied by the world of others
in the “they,” Dasein becomes occupied with the entities in its world, it becomes
occupied with ontical inquiry, qua science for instance, and it seeks to gain control over
38
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reality, rather than open itself to the being-question and the implications of it. In this
fallen state, Dasein is eager to do whatever is ordinary, distracting itself from the
difficulties of authentic thought.
The “falling” of Dasein remains hidden from itself. Dasein is unaware that it is
alienating itself from its “potentiality-for-Being.” Heidegger writes, “this plunge remains
hidden from Dasein… it gets interpreted as a way of ‘ascending’ and ‘living
correctly’.”42. The “they” influences Dasein in the form of societal values, norms and
expectations that Dasein then conforms to. This hides the fact that Dasein is actually
falling and hence alienating itself from being, and the possibility of understanding it. The
possibility of authentic being remains hidden from Dasein because, unaware, it falls into
the “they.” Dasein does not perceive this as a falling because it is covered up as an
“ascending” or a “living correctly.”
Science is a textbook example of this phenomena. We think it gives us answers
into being – into why entities are the way they are. Everyone praises scientific
advancements for doing this. But this is a “fallen” notion caused by the “they.” Science,
while excelling in the realm of the present-at-hand, does not help us understand being.
And with the influence of science, with the influence of the they, it becomes really hard
to actually buy into raising anew the being-question. This isn’t even presented to Dasein
by the “they” as a possible way to be, that is, to be open to the being-question. Rather,
Dasein stays engaged with the issues, beliefs, practices, norms, and so on, that are offered
to it everyday – and tranquilized it falls into them, falsely thinking it is ascending.

42
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Death, Anxiety, Authenticity & Resoluteness
We see now why reawakening the sense of being in us is so hard. Dasein naturally
falls – into the “they” and the meanings it presents. The “they” naturally masks this
paramount question for Dasein, as Dasein becomes concerned with average
everydayness, and not authentic being.43 Once Dasein has fallen, it becomes tranquilized
and thinks it understands everything already – because, never challenged, Dasein
exercises control over the entities it encounters in its everydayness. Heidegger wants us
to awaken from this slumber, to the question of being. How are we to do so?
Dasein is able to overcome “falling” because of anxiety, explains Heidegger. This
anxiety is caused by Dasein’s potential for authentic being, which it realizes in light of its
mortality. The reality is that we are all finite entities. All of us will die one day, it is just a
matter of when. In everyday existence we tend to ignore this looming possibility. But, at
times, we come face to face with it – resulting in anxiety. Heidegger explains, “Anxiety
thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of
the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein
back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-theworld.”44 Anxiety in the face of one’s finitude, a particular way for Dasein to be-in-theworld, is no doubt a difficult thing to experience. That is why it is so powerful – it shakes
Dasein out of its fallen, average, easy-going state of being. And because anxiety is such
an uncomfortable experience, it is easy to see why “Dasein prepares for itself a constant
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temptation towards falling.”45 Everydayness is just easier and more tempting. But when
Dasein realizes its finitude, through a near death experience, or through the death of a
loved one for instance, the anxiety Dasein thus experiences allows it to grasp for itself the
significance of its own life. This anxious Dasein stops trying to understand itself in terms
of what is “publically interpreted,” in terms of the “they,” and sees the possibility of
authentic existence as an available and enticing proposition.
Why is it that confronting death, confronting Dasein’s mortality, is able to provide
such a profound realization? Yes, the anxiety experienced in light of this fact is powerful,
no doubt. But why does that make Dasein want to be authentic? I can fathom that one
might experience a deep, nihilistic sorrow if one realizes that their life is finite and
insignificant in the larger context, resulting in the dismissal of this call to authenticity.
For Heidegger, this occurrence would be a result of Dasein’s falling, where Dasein
understands its being, and its death, in terms of the “they.” Death, for Heidegger, is “the
possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.”46 And, as we already know,
Dasein’s being is the issue for it, as it must necessarily choose a possible way to be.
Under this paradigm, death then, significantly limits Dasein’s possibilities. In ceasing to
exist, Dasein can no longer choose one possibility or another. This is what death results
in – and it is always a possibility for Dasein; a necessary one at that.
Crucially, and this will help us answer the question posed in the previous
paragraph about Dasein’s call to authenticity, Heidegger explains, “Death is Dasein’s
ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost
45
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potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue.”47 Unlike death, other
possibilities are ones that I can choose or not choose, and ones that can be chosen by
others or not, as well. But death is a possibility that is necessarily my own. No one else
can experience my death, nor I theirs. In my mortality being my own possibility, and in
me having to necessarily confront this mortality, I realize the fact that my possibilities are
limited. The anxiety caused by grasping the limited nature of my life pushes me to choose
possibilities for myself that I believe in and can get behind – authentic possibilities.
Authentic existence entails Dasein “choosing to make this choice,”48 in contrast to
inauthentic existence, in which Dasein chooses based on what’s easy, what’s convention,
or what’s expectation. Crucially, even authentic existence is influenced by the “they,” as
new meaning cannot just be fabricated by Dasein. Dasein is already in-a-world with a set
of meanings. Dasein’s existence is authentic insofar as it chooses a possibility provided to
it by its world, and acts in that world based on that choice. Consider the example of our
visit to the barber. Even if I authentically choose to get the good looking haircut, or
authentically choose to dye it purple – these options presented to me are a result of the
“they.” They have the meanings they do for me because they have appeared to me as
options to choose, as a result of the “they.”
We see now that Dasein has the possibility to be authentic, and the impetus to
choose to do so. It’s worth briefly noting at this juncture, that in being authentic, Dasein
has, you and I have, preliminarily opened ourselves to being. We have raised the question
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anew, just as Heidegger wanted, and are dealing with the implications of it, namely,
authentic being.
But what does authentic being actually entail? Heidegger explains, “Resoluteness,
as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world… And how should
it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else then Beingin-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Beingalongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.”49
Resoluteness entails coming to terms with our anxiety and owning up to our
responsibility to choose our own existence. Insofar as we avoid being resolute, as it is
difficult to do so,50 we are lulled into a false sense of comfort and a feeling that we are in
control of our being. But in becoming resolute, we develop a clearer conception of our
being. Following this, we are able to authentically choose this possibility or that, in light
of this clear, resolute conception of our being. The entities which we encounter as readyto-hand show up in light of this resolute conception of being as well. Their uses, for
Dasein’s purposes, become plainly apparent – because Dasein is now resolutely aware of
its own being. Dasein no longer seeks to master present-at-hand reality, or ontically
calculate and measure it, because it is now more aware of its own being. Dasein’s world
is no longer a they-world; it is one of authentic existence alongside others.
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is not covered here, but is a way for us to maintain being resolute, in a certain sense.
50

22

Dasein’s Finitude & Temporality: Reawakening to Being
It is our understanding of possibility, that is, Dasein’s possibility of authentic
existence, which deepens our understanding of Dasein’s being. Specifically, it is Dasein’s
resoluteness that enables it to be authentic, and become awake to the being-question.
Heidegger’s project is not yet finished, however. Resoluteness is not enough, but it as a
clue - it is resoluteness in the face of death that will enable us to better understand what
Heidegger calls the “ultimate foundation”51 of Dasein’s being: temporality.
We have already been speaking of Dasein choosing to be this way or that. We
have been speaking of Dasein’s ownmost possibility, that of death: the possibility of
having no more possibilities. We also spoke about Dasein’s being-in-the-world as the
concern it has for the entities that it encounters. We spoke of Dasein’s finitude as well.
These ideas presuppose a notion of temporality, within which Dasein chooses a
possibility, or is presently concerned with some entity, or within which Dasein is finite.
Ordinarily, we think of time in terms of a clock or a timeline. There is the present
moment, which we experience, and an infinite series of past and future moments behind
and ahead of us. For Heidegger, this conception of time is faulty – it is present-at-hand.
This faulty conception of time is due to our falling, due to the fact that all we deal with in
our day to day lives are entities. So how are we to correctly understand time, and how
does this relate to Dasein’s resoluteness and the being-question? I will explain.
Much like our fallen understanding of time, Heidegger’s conception of time still
consists of a past, present and future. However, for Heidegger, these aspects of time are
51
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deeply linked to how Dasein experiences them. He writes, “By… ‘futural’… We have in
mind the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards
itself.”52 Future, for Heidegger, is Dasein’s potential, its projection, its possibilities to be.
As we saw earlier, these possibilities are affected by various factors, including the they,
anxiety, and crucially, Dasein’s mortality. Unlike our fallen conception of the future,
which is infinite, for Dasein, its future is always finite. Of the past, Heidegger writes,
“…[It is] being Dasein authentically as it already was… Taking over over
throwness…”53. Past, in this sense, is Dasein’s being thrown – into a world already
constructed with certain meanings, values, norms, and so on. Lastly, the present involves
revealing and action. Heidegger writes, “Only as the Present in the sense of making
present, can resoluteness be what it is…”54.
Under this paradigm, the future, past and present are all inexorably linked. Given
Dasein’s past, the situation it was thrown into, it has a certain set of future possibilities it
can project into. And in its present, Dasein is faced with a world, one that reveals itself as
the way that it is because of Dasein’s past and future. Let’s examine an example to get a
better understanding of how Dasein relates to its past, present and future. Consider a
teenage boy who was born in a shanti town in Sao Paulo, Brazil. As you might know,
soccer is exceedingly popular throughout this country. Our boy has played, and still loves
to play soccer every day, with his friends after school. He has hopes of playing
professionally one day – he wants to be a professional soccer player.55 He cannot change
his past, the world he was thrown into. But his past, undoubtedly, effects his future, his
52
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possibilities to be. He has dreams of playing soccer professionally because he grew up
playing it, in a country that loves the sport – this is a result of the “they.” Also, given his
economic status, his future possibilities to achieve this dream are affected no doubt. Our
boy the soccer player, as his being is an issue for him, in his present, he is faced with
soccer balls, soccer teams, referees, watching soccer on TV, following his favorite team,
and so on. This present world is the way that it is because of our boy’s, Dasein’s, past and
future. As such, Dasein’s understanding of its being is grounded in temporality, in its
past, future, and present.
It is in the present, but crucially also because of the past and future, that Dasein
can be resolute in the face of death. While it is true that we do not go about our lives
thinking of our impending death every second, we are faced with this thought at times.
And when this happens, we experience anxiety. And as Heidegger has made clear, in the
face of this anxiety, it is imperative that we take a resolute stance about our reality as
finite beings thrown into a world, and projecting into certain possibilities. In taking this
resolute stance, and choosing to be authentically oneself, we open ourselves to being and
experience an “…unshakable joy…”56.
In this moment, after much tribulation, we have “raise[d] anew the question of the
meaning of being.”57 This is so hard for us because of our tendency to think of Dasein’s
being, of our being, vis-à-vis science, as present-at-hand. Due to the “they” and our
falling into the everyday entities that we come across, and our tendency for easy-going
average everydayness, we begin to lull ourselves into thinking of ourselves in the same
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way as these entities we encounter. It takes the anxiety caused by the realization of our
finitude, and a resolute response to this anxiety, along with an un-fallen understanding of
temporality, to truly shake us from this hypnosis.
We appear to have reached our goal. We have re-awoken, from a long and deep
slumber, to the sense of being Heidegger considers so important. In doing so, we have
faced up to our many shortcomings. Where does this leave us though? Do we now have
an answer to the being-question? I’d say… sort of. Remember that Heidegger’s aim, from
the outset, was to “raise anew the question of the meaning of being.”58 Well, we have
certainly been able to see how he does that. He never claims to give us an answer to this
question – or to even aim to do so. We might think, after taking so much trouble to peel
back layers and layers of Dasein’s baggage, shouldn’t we finally be left with an explicit
understanding of being? That would be wrong. There is no explicit understanding of
being. For finite Dasein, for us, there can never be one. More will be said on this in the
next chapter.
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Is There an Answer to the Being-Question?
With the resolute acceptance of our finite being, there comes the revelation of
infinite being in comparison to that. The infinite being here can be understood as the
highest being, or the most fundamental being – that from which all other beings derive
and share in common. Let’s call it general being. Traditionally, this idea of general being
is interpreted as present-at-hand. As you might have guessed already, Heidegger believes
this notion to be misguided. For instance, Christianity interprets the general being as an
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God.59 Science interprets it as the big-bang in
most cases, and as a multiverse in others, for instance. For those of you familiar with
Continental philosophy, Hegel’s “absolute spirit” is another way of interpreting this idea
of general being, much like Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence is as well.
All these ways of interpreting general being “depersonalize [it] into a first
cause.”60 They explain this being, albeit in differing ways, as an entity outside an infinite
regress of grounds. They forget, due to a fallen desire to master and understand all of
reality, due to faulty ontological assumptions, that “being withholds and even conceals
itself by nature because it is too rich to be fully revealed to finite human
understanding.”61 We have already shown that we are, that Dasein is, fundamentally
finite. In falling, in avoiding anxiety through average everydayness, and in not becoming
resolute in the face of our finitude, we forget, we ignore, this profound fact.
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The reality is that, entities, although available plentifully for us to use and
measure and calculate, always posses a relation to being. And in our finitude, this being
can never be explicitly understood by us. This does not mean that we cannot be aware of,
or awake to, this being. After all, that was Heidegger’s aim. In being open to being, we
realize that we will never actually understand it explicitly. We can know that being
grounds our experience, grounds temporality, and opens a world for us where entities
show up. We can avoid placing too much import on the present-at-hand, overcoming our
desire to understand and master all of reality. But the human condition makes accepting
all this very hard.
Humanity strives, thorough science, through philosophy, through theology, to
attain an absolute understanding of reality. And in doing so, it strives to master reality
and gain control over it – to mask our condition as finite beings. In the modern world, we
are, relatively speaking, much closer to this ideal. A simple Google search can inform me
of virtually anything that I want to know.62 In a matter of hours, I can be on the other side
of the planet. Sitting at my living room, I can talk face-to-face someone from a different
country. This is a huge leap from what used to be possible – we have indeed gained an
unprecedented control over reality. Importantly however, for Heidegger, we have only
changed our present-at-hand relationship to reality, to the entities we encounter. We have
done nothing to improve our relationship to being. In fact, we falsely think we have,
because of our success in mastering what is present-at-hand.

62

ONT 6

28

The truth is: there is no absolute truth63 like what we strive for. For Heidegger,
this archetype of absolute understanding that we strive for is fundamentally irreconcilable
with our actual understanding, which is finite, and which depends on temporality. So,
responding to the title of this chapter: No, there is no direct, explicit answer to the beingquestion. However, yes, there is an awakening that happens when this question is
examined thoroughly, like we have done in this paper. What dictates whether this all
matters is how Dasein, how you and I, go about living are lives having learnt what we
have just learnt.
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Objections & Responses
At this stage I would like to consider and respond to what I take to be the
strongest objections to the arguments I have just presented. My hope is to satisfy every
critic, but I cannot promise to be able to do this. I hope that I am at least able to show you
the advantages of accepting the arguments I defend – and in doing so, I hope that the
importance of Heidegger’s question shines through.
The first objection I will respond to was briefly addressed in Chapter 4 of this
paper. Heidegger’s move to interrogate Dasein as a means to clarify the being-question
was criticized. The strongest objection to this part of Heidegger’s argument, in my view,
notes the fact that the being of a particular type of entity, namely Dasein’s being, is
interrogated in order help us understand the meaning of being in general. The critic might
ask: why does Dasein’s being, one particular entity’s being, take priority over any other
entity’s being in our investigation?
In response to this worry, I would first have to point to Heidegger’s account of
the ontological difference. Remember that ontological inquiry pertains to being, while
ontical inquiry pertains to entities. And remember also that we are looking for some
entity to interrogate, as we are inquiring into being, and entities are all that exist. Which
entity should we choose then? Given that we want to find out about being, whether about
one particular entity’s being or about being in general, the best and only option for us
seems to be Dasein. Specifically, this is because no other entity can inform us about
being. No other entity possesses a relationship with being, or even thinks about being,
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other than Dasein. As such, in this respect, Dasein rightfully takes priority over all other
entities.
There was another criticism levied in Chapter 4 which I will now briefly address.
The critic, responding to this same move made by Heidegger, asks: Is Heidegger
providing a philosophical account or an anthropologic investigation? In focusing on
Dasein, Heidegger is in no way giving up or losing sight of his goal, which is to
reawaken the sense of being in us. This goal is driven by a metaphysical fact, namely, the
fact that there is something, rather than nothing. In asking why, Heidegger begins his
philosophical account. This leads him to Dasein for reasons I’ve just defended, but
crucially, Heidegger is still very much doing philosophy.
The next few objections I respond to address Heidegger’s account of authenticity.
One potential problem I see with this account of authenticity is that it places a lot of
significance on our individual selves, as we must be resolute in light of our finitude. This
makes it hard to justify benevolent acts such as parenting, for instance. With parenting,
one is putting all of one’s resources into an entity, namely one’s child, that one obviously
hopes will live beyond one’s own death. If I am to be resolute and authentic in the face of
my individual death, it is hard to justify putting all my resources and energy into my
child, who will most likely live beyond me, or so the worry goes.
I have two responses to this. First, it can be argued that in raising my child now,
and putting effort into this endeavor, I am ensuring for myself a better life when I am
older. I would still be acting resolute in the face of my mortality. I can see how this idea
might be interpreted as slightly self-centered, leading me to my second response: What if
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I authentically choose to be a sacrificial father64, for instance? What if my being is, what
if I exist, insofar as I am a sacrificial father? As long as I have chosen this role for myself,
and not been levelled into it by the “they,” this is still a way for me to authentically be
myself, while still being a loving, caring, benevolent, sacrificial parent.
The next criticism with regards to authenticity criticizes the weight Heidegger
places on Dasein’s authentic existence, over and above the other modes of Dasein’s
existence. Even Heidegger says that only at certain times does Dasein in fact act
authentically, so why does he prioritize authentic existence if it is just one of the many
ways in which Dasein can be? This is a valid concern, and one that requires
understanding Dasein’s special way of being in order to address. Dasein exists as its
being is always an issue for it. In this light, Dasein is thrown into a world that provides it
various possibilities from which to chose, and thus project some particular possibility. As
such, because this choice necessarily faces our finite Dasein, unlike any other entity –
authentic existence is prioritized. This would not be the case if we were talking about
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand entities, because they do not have to choose which way
to be, and their being is not finite. Dasein is unique in this respect.
Stemming from this criticism, it dawned on me that we seem to be taking for
granted, in our arguments, that Dasein posses free-will. Free-will seems to be a necessary
condition of being an entity with Dasein’s way of being – as it must always choose
among the possibilities available to it. I’m not sure a sceptic, or a staunch determinist for
instance, would accept this premise, at least not without justification. So, as for a
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justification for Dasein’s free-will, this is what I would say: Heidegger aims to capture
the fundamental phenomena that we take for granted. He aims to make them explicit. As
such, I think he would argue that this critic has succumb to the effects of falling, and is
thinking about being with certain hidden ontological assumptions. I can’t say for sure
whether the determinist would agree with this, but I don’t think Heidegger can do much
more by way of argument to convince her.
In addition, it’s worth mentioning to our determinist that Dasein, essentially, must
be able to choose. It’s being is constituted by the fact that it must take a stance on its own
being.65 As such, Dasein would not be Dasein if it were not able to choose. Admittedly,
these choices might not be considered free, as they may be determined by the “they.” But
insofar as we accept that Dasein can act authentically, then we must also accept that
Dasein is free – and I have just defended authenticity against several charges.
The last objection I will defend against is a rejection of the negative light
Heidegger casts on our desire to master reality. Recall that we seek to achieve an absolute
understanding of reality, and as such, gain complete control over it – this is to mask our
anxiety over our finitude. Heidegger’s critic might ask: Why is this bad? Why can’t I just
keep mastering reality, keep improving my present-at-hand understanding of it, and keep
improving science and technology along with this? I’m fine the way I am now; why
should I even bother opening myself to being?
This is certainly a strong criticism, as it requires that I convince the critic of the
importance of examining Heidegger’s question in the first place. This importance, as we
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have intimated, has to do with the fact that we, finite and fragile, constantly have the
burden of choosing our being. Given that we constantly must choose, and given the
reality that one day we necessarily can choose no more, we come to the realization that
there is something bigger66 than us finite beings out there. This being, let’s call it infinite
being67 is not God nor a first cause, or any such entity. It cannot even be put into words –
that’s how obscure it is. All we know is that this infinite being is so fundamentally
important, so hidden and obscure, that its value isn’t contingent on anything. No positive
argument can be made for this being, as any such argument would be making false
ontological assumptions, and begin conceiving of this being as an entity.
We all know, even the critic I am addressing, that this infinite being exists. It is
what grounds the entities I encounter every day, what grounds my finite temporal
existence. Thus, in knowing that this infinite being necessarily exists, in truly knowing
this fact of reality and in internalizing it, I’d ask the critic the following: How can you
continue living the way you do, concerned with mastery of the present-at-hand, when you
know that you are misguided in doing so? You are already aware of this being; I urge you
to escape the clutches of the “they,” and be resolute about your existence.
Although I have tried to address what I consider to be the strongest criticisms to
the arguments I have presented, there are no doubt many more objections I could address.
I hope, though, that the responses I have provided convince you that the question of the
meaning of being is not only an important one to ask, but also a vital one to examine the
implications of.
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Conclusions
Our aim at the outset was to reawaken in us the sense of being that has become so
confounded and forgotten. Being, we learnt, assumes a special relationship with us, with
Dasein. Being depends on our understanding of it, but we also depend on being, as we are
the entity who tries to understand being - by making our being an issue for us.
This issue, of us having to choose a possibility to be, is a situation we are
necessarily and constantly faced with. In confronting our fragile reality as finite beings,
anxiously, we realize that this possibility to be will one-day cease to be a possibility. But
I myself realize this, for myself. And as such, I take a resolute stance on my being. I
chose, in light of this resolute stance, an authentic way to be.
With the realization and acceptance of my finitude, resolute though I may be, I am
also humbled, as I accept my understanding as inherently limited in relation to being. I
have awoken to being in the sense Heidegger was arguing for. Its worth emphasizing that
Heidegger, at no point, claims to provide a positive, explicit answer to the beingquestion. Rightly so, as there can be none – not for finite beings of our sort.
There is a sense in which one is fundamentally limited in being able to argue for
the kind of conclusion Heidegger is shooting for. Any explanation of being that is
comprehendible by us in mere language will demand a further ground. The best we can
hope for is to understand being in light of our finite being, and accept the positive
implications of this privileged view.
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